Adam Leite

Adam Leite

Associate Professor, Philosophy

Education

  • University of California, Berkeley, B. A. 1992
  • Harvard University, Ph.D. 2000

Research interests

I began my research career as an epistemologist focused on issues relating to empirical justification and our knowledge of the world. In this part of my work I have focused mainly on philosophical arguments for external world skepticism and their relation to our actual epistemic practices. Over time I became increasingly interested in self-knowledge, and this led to an interest in clinical psychoanalysis, which now has a central place in my research and teaching interests. (Thanks to a Mellon New Directions Fellowship, I spent 2011-12 studying clinical psychoanalysis at the University College London Psychoanalysis Unit in the Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology.) I find clinical practice to be a rich source of data for understanding central features of self-conscious thought (among other things), and this is a primary focus of my current writing. To be clear, my interest in psychoanalysis is not the sort that is sometimes found, say, in literature departments, insofar as I look primarily to the best current clinical research and practice (e.g., the work of Peter Fonagy and his colleagues at UCL); my interests abut on issues that would quite naturally be addressed in the philosophy of cognitive science and psychology, though I tend to focus more on the clinical and phenomenological side. I also have significant interest in the emotions, particularly in interpersonal contexts, and am engaged in an ongoing project concerning love. I would be very interested in exploring possibilities for collaboration with psychologists, cognitive scientists, and others.

Gary Ebbs (Professor) gebbs@indiana.edu http://www.garyebbs.net

I am interested in the sort of naturalism that results from accepting the scientific orientation in philosophy that logical empiricists such was Carnap urged, but giving up the logical empiricist's analytic-synthetic distinction, following W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. I am sympathetic with scientific/philosophical projects that aim to replace traditional concepts of mind and cognition with naturalistically respectable, explanatory clarifications of them. I am therefore interested in seeing how much of the work of explanation in cognitive science can be done without any thickly "normative" notions of representation. Among other things I have written extensively about how to reconcile naturalistic accounts of mental content with the idea that we ordinarily know the contents of our utterances without any special empirical investigation.

Representative publications

Illocution, Expression, and Self‐Consciousness (2019)
Adam Leite
European Journal of Philosophy, 27 (3), 777-785

Skepticism and epistemic asymmetry (2019)
Adam Leite
Philosophical Issues , 29 (1), 184-197

The Plain Inquirer’s Plain Evidence against the Global Skeptical Scenarios (2018)
Adam Leite
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 8 (3), 208-222

Projective Identification, Clinical Context, and Philosophical Elucidation (2018)
Adam Leite
Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology , 25 (2), 81-87

Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement (2018)
Adam Leite
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97 (1), 150-171

Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming&quest (2004)
Adam Leite
Philosophical Quarterly, 54 (215), 232-251

Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief: A Reply to Tom Kelly’s “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique” (2007)
Adam Leite
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (2), 456-464

Reasonable Doubts: Skepticism and the Structure of Empirical Justification (2000)
Adam Leite
Dissertation, Harvard University,

Epistemological externalism and the project of traditional epistemology (2005)
Adam Leite
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70 (3), 505-533

Why Don't I Know That I'm Not a BIV? (2015)
Adam Leite
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 90 (1), 205-213

On Williamson's arguments that knowledge is a mental state (2005)
Adam Leite
Ratio, 18 (2), 165-175

A localist solution to the regress of epistemic justification (2005)
Adam Leite
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83 (3), 395-421

Some Thoughts on "Varieties of Skepticism" by James Conant and Andrea Kern (2015)
Adam Leite
Nordic Wittgenstein Review , 4 (2), 146-152

How to take skepticism seriously (2010)
Adam Leite
Philosophical Studies , 148 (1), 39-60

Epistemological Externalism and the Project of Traditional Epistemology (2005)
Adam Leite
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70 (3), 505-533