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Education
Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley, Philosophy, June 1990.
B.S. University of California, Santa Barbara, Physics, 1981, summa cum laude.
Professional Experience
- Professor, Department of Philosophy, Indiana University, August 2010-present.
- Colonel Alan R. and Margaret G. Crow CLAS Term Professor, August 2008-July 2010.
- Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, June 2005 – July 2008.
- Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, June 1995 – May 2005.
- Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, August 1990 - May 1995.
Research Interests
I work on foundational issues in the philosophy of language (esp. logical form and semantics), epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of action (esp. collective action). Among other projects, I am currently working on a book on collective agency titled, Collective Action: From Individual to Institutional Agency.
Representative Publications
Books
- Donald Davidson's Truth-theoretic Semantics, with Ernie Lepore, Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language and Reality, with Ernie Lepore, Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Donald Davidson, (ed.) Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Articles and Book Chapters
- "Truth and Meaning Redux," with Ernie Lepore, Philosophical Studies, 154, 2011: 251-277.
- "Intuitions and Relativity," Philosophical Psychology, 23(4), August 2010: 427-45.
- "Fodor’s Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind," with Susan Schneider, Mind and Language, 23, 2008: 123-143.
- "The Concept of Truth and the Semantics of the Truth Predicate," with Emil Badici, Inquiry, 2007, 50(6): 622–638.
- "The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First vs. Third Person Approaches," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Philosophy and the Empirical, 2007, 31 (1), 128–159.
- "The Argument from Normative Autonomy for Collective Agents,"Journal of Social Philosophy, 2007, 38(3): 410-427.
- "Collective Intentional Behavior from the Standpoint of Semantics," Noûs, 2007, 41(3): 355-393.
- "Semantics for Nondeclaratives," with Daniel Boisvert, The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, eds. B. Smith and E. Lepore, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 864-892.
- "Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations?" Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, ed. R. Stainton, Blackwell, 2006, pp. 259-274.
- "Davidson's Objection to Horwich's Minimalism about Truth," Journal of Philosophy, August 2004, pp. 429-437.
- "Rationality, Language and the Principle of Charity," in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, eds. A. Mele and P. Rawling, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 343-362.
- "The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview," in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, eds. T. Warfield and S. Stich, Blackwell, 2003, pp. 1-46.
- "Outline of a Truth Conditional Semantics for Tense," with Ernie Lepore, in Tense, Time and Reference, eds. A. Jokic and Q. Smith, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003, pp. 49-105.
- "Vagueness and the Sorites Paradox" with Greg Ray, Philosophical Perspectives 16, 2002.
- "What is Logical Form?" with Ernie Lepore, in Logical Form and Language, eds. G. Preyer and G. Peter, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 54-90.
- "What is the role of a truth theory in a meaning theory?" in Truth and Meaning: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Seven Bridge Press, 2001, pp. 142-163.
- "The Semantics and Pragmatics of Complex Demonstratives," with Ernie Lepore, Mind 109 (April 2000): 199-240.
- "Semantics for Opaque Contexts," with Greg Ray, Philosophical Perspectives, 12, Language, Mind and Ontology (1998): 141-166.
- "Explaining Why Things Look the Way They Do," in Perception, Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science, v. 5, ed. by Kathleen Akins, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1996): 18-60.
- "Singular Thought and the Cartesian Theory of Mind," Noûs, (December 1996): 434-460.
- "Shape Properties and Perception," Perception, Philosophical Issues, v. 6, ed. Enrique Villanueva, Ridgeview (1995): 325-350.
- "Why the difference between Quantum and Classical Mechanics is Irrelevant to the Mind Body Problem," Psyche 2(5) (October 1995).
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